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A Year Later:

Klaeren V. Lisle and the
Troubles it has Wrought
Victor P Filippini,Jr.*
In the fall of 2002, the
Illinois supreme court issued its
opinion in People ex rel.
Klaeren v. illage ofLisle,l
reversing more than forty years
of judicial precedent by holding
that "municipal bodies act in
administrative or quasi-judicial
capacities when those bodies
conduct zoning hearings concerning a special use petition." 2
Although concerns promptly
were raised about the potential
adverse effects of this decision, 3
the past fifteen months have
revealed that the difficulties
encountered by courts, property
owners and developers, and
local governments as a result of
the Klaeren decision may be
worse than imagined.
Some of these difficulties were expected. For example, local zoning bodies have
seen simple hearings extend ad
nauseum as interested parties
present-and zoning bodies
admit-all evidence that might be
relevant to avoid the risk of
having potentially relevant evi*Victor P. Filippini, Jr. heads
Holland & Knight's Illinois land
use and government practice
group, where he practices principally in the areas of state and
local government law, as well as
land use and development law.
Mr. Filippini has represented private and public clients in land
use and related development litigation for more than 20 years.
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Illinois zoning law, but in doing so it
appears that Klaeren has produced
square pegs that do not fit easily into
the round holes of precedent and
statutory procedures. Although these
analytical difficulties may be related
to the individual cases themselves,
they are more likely evidence of the
fundamental flaws in the Klaeren
decision itself.
Perhaps the best example of
the confusion over Klaeren is the
supreme court's own decision in
Hawthorne v. Village of Olympia
Fields.7 In Hawthorne, the court considered the validity of the Village's
prohibition of a "day care home" and
its denial of a variance to allow such
use. The hearing on the variance
clearly involved "the property rights
of the interested parties" and "factfinding ... to decide disputed facts
based on evidence adduced at the
hearing"; 8 the determination regarding
the variance was plainly a "binding
determination[ ] . . . directly
affect[ing] the legal rights of individuals." 9 Even though the variance in
Hawthorne featured the same type of
process and decision-making as the
special use permit in Klaeren, the
supreme court concluded that the
need to enact an ordinance when
granting such a variance made the
variance process "a legislative act" to
Klaeren's Confused Progeny
which the Administrative Review
Law does not apply.10
For more than a year, the
The Court attempted to dissupreme court and several appellate
tinguish the variance in Hawthorne
courts have tried to reconstruct
from the special use permit in
1
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dence kept from a reviewing court
because it was not part of the record
before the hearing body.
Similarly, we have seen local zoning
boards make plainly erroneous evidentiary rulings-such as, in one case,
refusing to allow a petitioner to crossexamine the author of a staff report
entered into the record by the municipality 4-that will likely result in orders
of remand for further hearing,5 with
attendant delays for property owners
trying to obtain a final decision on
what can be developed on their property. Likewise, individual members
of the local zoning board, as well as
neighbors who have testified at a zoning hearing, have found themselves in
the unwelcome situation of being
named as defendants in litigation that
ensued from the denial of a special
use permit.
This article, however, is not a
recitation of post-Klaeren war stories
from local zoning hearings. Rather, it
focuses on the struggles that courts
have had in applying the Klaeren
decision. In addition, it will re-examine the supreme court's analysis of the
legislative zoning scheme to determine whether the court's revolutionary zoning decision inadvertently rewrote the Illinois zoning enabling
acts. 6
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Klaeren. Specifically, the court
asserted that there is "a clear distinction between variances and special
uses" in that variances apply "where
the desired use is forbidden under the
existing zoning ordinances," whereas
special uses merely allow "a property
owner to use his property in a manner
the zoning ordinances already address
and allow." 1 This rationale, however,
lacks support from the statutory language or from the historic view of
special uses.
Under the relevant statutes,
variances are only authorized when
(i) the applicable zoning regulations
provide for such variances, (ii) the
granting of specific variances are not
prohibited "in whole or in part" in the
zoning ordinance, and (iii) the statutory standards for variances are met. 12
Similarly, special use permits need to
be identified as such in the local zoning ordinances, and they are "permitted only upon evidence that such use
meets the standards established for
such classification in the [zoning]
ordinances." 1 3 Moreover, despite the
Court's recent venture into special use
permits, the longstanding view of
courts had been that special uses
allow an owner "to use his property in
a manner contrary to the [zoning]
ordinance provided that the intended
use is one of those specifically listed
in the ordinance and provided that the
public convenience will be served by
the use."'1 4 Although variances and
special use permits serve different
functions and are subject to different
standards, both are forms of relief
from the generally applicable regulations of a local zoning ordinance and
are only authorized to the extent
allowed by such local zoning regulations.
The "distinction" between
variances and special use permits
articulated in Hawthorne is even
more troublesome in light of the
quasi-judicial nature of variances

under the relevant statutes. In both
the Illinois Municipal Code and the
Counties Code, the General Assembly
has made clear that variances are
quasi-judicial in nature and subject to
the Administrative Review Law
("ARL")1 5-at least when the local
zoning board makes the final decision
on the variance request. 16 The

Despite the Court's
recent venture into
special use permits,
the longstanding view
of courts had been
that special uses
allow an owner "to
use his property in a
manner contrary to
the zoning ordinance."
supreme court, however, has stated
that when variances are granted by
ordinance, they become legislative
acts.17 If a statutorily-recognized
quasi-judicial function like the granting of variances is transformed into a
legislative act because of "the enactment of an ordinance,"18 then the
granting of special use permits-which
can only occur through the enactment
of an ordinance according to the relevant statutes-must a fortiori be a legislative act. Prior to Klaeren, Illinois
courts have recognized the statutory
differences between the quasi-judicial
nature of variances and the legislative
nature of special use permits. 19
Without any serious consideration of
the provisions in the applicable
statutes, however, the supreme court
has now turned those analyses on
their head.
In light of the supreme court's
confusion in applying its own ruling
in Klaeren, the difficulties that appellate courts have encountered are far
more understandable. In Gallik v.
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County of Lake,20 the Appellate Court
for the Second District applied
Klaeren to a county's denial of a special use permit. In the absence of
clear direction from the supreme
court regarding the applicable standard for reviewing the county's decision, the court determined that such
decision was subject to the ARL.21
What is surprising about the
ruling is that the zoning provisions in
the Counties Code do not provide for
appeals under the ARL except when a
final decision of a county zoning
board of appeals is involved. 22
Because the ARL applies only when
specifically authorized by statute, 23 it
would therefore seem inapplicable to
the county board's decision on a special use permit. Nevertheless, the
court looked to an entirely separate
article of the Counties Code and concluded that the ARL would apply.
Specifically, the court relied on
Section 1-6007 of the Counties Code,
which states: "The decisions of the
county board are subject to judicial
review under the Administrative
Review Law." 2 4

Although Section 1-6007
appears in a division of the Counties
Code that provides an administrative
process for determining the validity
of monetary claims against a county, 25

the Gallik court stretched this provision to find some ascertainable basis
for reviewing special use permit decisions as quasi-judicial actions instead
of pursuant to the familiar "LaSalle
factor" analysis used for reviewing
legislative zoning actions.26 One
requires little imagination to appreciate the mischief and confusion that
the Gallik court's interpretation of
Section 1-6007 will cause if literally
applied to any decision of a county
board.27
In Shipp v. County of
Kankakee,28 the Appellate Court for
the Third District affirmed the denial
of a special use permit on procedural
WINTER 2004
WINTER 2004
2
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grounds, but it implicitly followed
Gallik when it noted in dicta that
denials of special use permits after
Klaeren "are subject to administrative
review." 29 Curiously, the court did
not explain how it would have
reviewed the entire case, which
involved a county board's denial of
both a variance as well as a special
use permit. Presumably, under
Klaeren and Hawthorne, the court
would have reviewed the special use
permit on the public hearing record
pursuant to the ARL, but it would
have conducted a de novo evidentiary
trial on the variance. This would not
only nurture inefficiency, but it would
increase the risk of inconsistent outcomes. (Prior to Klaeren, a court
would have conducted a single de
novo trial to seek evidence on both
issues.)
The confusion resulting from

Oak Grove also
illustrates how
Klaeren has made the
entire zoning process
more legalistic thereby
making it less
accessible to the
individual citizen.
Klaeren may be best illustrated in the
case of Oak Grove.30 In that case, the
Appellate Court for the Second
District reconsidered a prior decision31 after a remand from the
Supreme Court to determine the
effects of Klaeren. The court ultimately decided that it would not
apply Klaeren retroactively, 32 but the
Supreme Court has again remanded
the case to have the appellate court
consider further whether Klaeren
should apply.3 3 Interestingly, the
appellate court chose not to apply
Klaeren retroactively because to do so
would change the nature of the speWINTER 2004
Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

cial use application from a petition to
a legislative body (which does not
require a lawyer to represent a corporation) to the filing of a quasi-judicial
action (which does require a licensed
attorney to represent a corporation). 34
Were Klaeren to apply in Oak Grove,
the plaintiff church would have its
claim dismissed because its pastor
filed the original special use request
on behalf of the church, and he was
not a licensed attorney. 35 Thus, in
addition to pointing out a fundamental difference in the manner that residents interact with their local governments pursuant to a legislative
process versus an adjudicative
process, Oak Grove also illustrates
how Klaeren has made the entire
zoning process more legalistic thereby making it less accessible to the
36
individual citizen.
zonrinrcessin more luregaitcothee
The upshot of these earlymm
post-Klaeren decisions is that Illinois

II

In rejecting more than forty
years of precedent, the supreme court
did not identify any intractable problems with the pre-existing manner for
adjudicating zoning disputes in
Illinois. 3 7 Nor did the court point to
any glaring inconsistencies between
the judicial treatment of special use
permits as legislative actions and the
statutory requirements in the zoning
enabling acts. Rather, the court
decided to dramatically change the
legal landscape of Illinois zoning law
based on a discussion in Living
Word38 that focused on the
remarks of a few commentators about "the clear
weight of authority"
among various other tcu
states. 39

A

tts3

itself, are struggling to find
their way in the uncharted
territory beyond Klaeren.
Ordinarily, courts could
look at the relevant
statutory provisions
for direction, but,
as will be
discussed
below,

Klaeren
cannot be
reconciled
with the

dp

schemes
for local
zoning, so the
courts are left
without meaningful
guideposts.

The Statutory Bases for
Special Use Permits: A
Second Look
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REPORTER
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Unfortunately, neither Klaeren nor
Living Word showed the court undertaking even a
cursory review of the relevant statutory language regarding special uses
and local zoning. 40 This profound
oversight of the underlying statutory
basis for local zoning authority begs
the question of whether the Klaeren
court improperly donned the General
Assembly's hat in making its ruling.
Had the supreme court
attempted to interpret the zoning
statutes instead of re-writing them
sight unseen, several key points
would have become immediately
apparent. First, the General
Assembly fully understood the difference between quasi-judicial actions
and legislative actions by specifically
subjecting certain local zoning decisions to the ARL. In the zoning
enabling acts of the Municipal Code
and the Counties Code, the General
Assembly expressly established that
final zoning actions taken by a local
zoning board are to be reviewed
under the ARL.41 No similar provi-

sions are made for the review of
actions of the corporate authorities of
municipalities or counties, even
though the General Assembly has
authorized or required that a variety
of zoning actions can only be granted
by having the corporate authorities
adopt an ordinance. 42
Second, in developing procedures for granting special use permits,
the General Assembly neither
required a municipal zoning board of
appeals to be involved, 43 nor permitted any body other than the corporate
authorities to approve a special use
permit-and then only by ordinance.44
Furthermore, any suggestion that the
adoption of an ordinance was intended to be a mere expression of a quasijudicial action fails because the
General Assembly authorized the ultimate legislative tool-a super-majority
vote-to carry the day over an unfavor-

able recommendation from the hearing body.45

Third, the General
Assembly's specific intent not to have
ordinance-approved special uses subject to administrative review is apparent in the zoning statutes providing
for the appointment of a hearing officer. 46 In the Counties Code, whenever a hearing officer makes a final zoning decision, review is available
under the ARL. 47 But when a county
board makes the final decision on a
zoning petition, the General
Assembly did not authorize administrative review. The General
Assembly's intent is more clear under
the hearing officer provisions of the
Municipal Code: if a hearing officer
makes the final decision on variances
or special uses, those decisions are to
be reviewed under the ARL; if a hearing officer merely recommends and
the corporate authorities retain final
decision-making authority, review
under the ARL is not authorized. 48
Moreover, to grant a variance or special use permit that was not favorably
reviewed by the hearing officer, a
super-majority vote of the corporate
authorities is required. 49
In light of the Municipal
Code provisions regarding hearing
officers, the supreme court's rationale
for distinguishing between variances
and special uses as explained in
Hawthorne50 completely breaks
down. In Hawthorne, the supreme
court asserts that "Illinois law makes
a clear distinction between variances
and special uses,"5 yet the General
Assembly treats them identically in
65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C). While
variances and special uses may be
used differently and under different
circumstances, they are both tools that
the General Assembly has treated as
legislative actions when in the hands
of the local corporate authorities.
Although the supreme court
in Living Word suggested that the

4 1PUBLIC INTEREST IAW REPORTER
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General Assembly exhibited its intent
to treat special uses as quasi-judicial
actions when it amended the special
use provisions of the Municipal Code

Based on the statutes
granting zoning powers
to local governments,
it is evident that the
General Assembly has
made express,
conscious decisions to
treat certain zoning
actions as
quasi-judicial that
should be reviewed
under the ARL.
in 1969,52 the court's analysis on that
point also fell short. In citing Geneva
ResidentialAssociation v. City of
Geneva,53 the court failed to note that
the Geneva Residential case did not
review a municipality's decision-making, but the municipality's compliance
with statutory procedures. 54
Moreover, the Geneva
Residential court considered a statutory amendment that required a hearing
body to make findings of fact on special uses and variances.5 5 Further, the
Geneva Residential court concluded
that this change made "thefact-finding process for municipal special use
permits ... vested in an administrative agency"-to-wit: a zoning board of
appeals or other hearing body5 6-thereby removing "the local legislature ...
from the fact-finding process" and
eliminating "adhoc granting ofpermits by the local legislature."57
Because the underlying concern was
that "Legislative bodies are not
equipped .. . to ascertainfactual
questions which depend upon evidence of individual circumstances,"58
the court in Geneva Residential saw
the separation of the fact-finding role
WINTER 2004
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from the decision-making role as preserving the legislative function of the
municipal corporate authorities in
granting special uses.59
As a final example that special uses are legislative acts based
upon the statutory structure of the
zoning enabling acts, one merely
needs to trace the recent statutory history of special uses. In particular,
after the 1969 changes to the
Municipal Code discussed in Geneva
Residential, the General Assembly
adopted two major laws regarding
special use permits. The first
occurred in 1985 when the General
Assembly adopted the hearing officer
provisions in the zoning enabling act
of the Municipal Code. 60 As discussed above, 61 those provisions
allowed hearing officers to serve as
the decision-maker for special uses, 62
or as the fact-finder for the corporate
authorities who must adopt an ordinance approving a special use
permit. 63 Importantly, only in
instances where the hearing officer
was also the decision-maker did the
General Assembly deem it appropriate to apply the ARL.64
The second legislative development occurred in 1998, when the
General Assembly gave statutory
recognition to special uses in the
Counties Code.6 5 Certainly, if the
General Assembly intended special
use decisions by a county board to be
quasi-judicial in nature, it would have
made these decisions subject to the
ARL. But it did not. The General
Assembly did, however, authorize a
county to delegate its special use
decision-making authority to a hearing officer,66 whose decisions are
subject to review under the ARL as
quasi-judicial actions. 67
Based on the statutes granting
zoning powers to local governments,
it is evident that the General
Assembly has made express, conscious decisions to treat certain zon2004
WINTER 2004
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ing actions as quasi-judicial that
should be reviewed under the ARL.
It is equally evident that the General
Assembly has not subjected any local
zoning decisions that are made by
ordinance to the ARL. Given the
longstanding history of judicial
review of ordinance-approved zoning
decisions (including special uses) as
legislative actions subject to de novo
review pursuant to the LaSalle factors, as well as the General
Assembly's recent enactments involving special uses, the proper conclusion to draw is that the General
Assembly intended special uses to be
legislative in nature. 68 Thus, in
declaring that special uses are quasijudicial in nature, the Klaeren Court
ignored the statutory scheme relating
to special uses and effectively
usurped the General Assembly's legislative prerogative regarding the
exercise of local zoning powers.
Short- and Long-Term Solutions
By declaring that special use
ordinances are adjudicative in nature,
the supreme court overstepped its
authority and re-wrote Illinois statutory law. Moreover, in doing so, the
court has confused Illinois zoning,
both as a practical matter,69 and as a
legal matter. 70
The General Assembly must
step in and clean up the mess that
Klaeren has caused. A simple, quick
fix is available: add a sentence at the
end of Section 11-13-13 of the
Municipal Code that states: "All final
decisions of the corporate authorities
under this Division shall be legislative actions." 7 1
Although the Supreme Court
may have decided Klaeren for the
wrong reasons, 72 perhaps Illinois is
out of step with other states. If so,
there may be good reason to re-examine comprehensively the legislative
scheme for local zoning decisions.

This would be a task for the General
Assembly, however, not the courts.
1. 202 Ill. 2d 164 (2002). The Court issued its
opinion on October 18, 2002, and a subsequent order denying a petition for rehearing on
December 2, 2002. The petition for rehearing
raised several issues, including a request to
have the Court's opinion apply prospectively
only.
2. 202 Ill. 2d at 183.
3. See, e.g., "If It Ain't Broke, Fix It?:
Assessing the Impact of Klaeren v. Lisle on
Illinois Zoning Law," 8 Pub. Int. L. Rep.10
(2003).
4. In re Victory Auto Wreckers, Inc., Village of
Bensenville Community Development
Commission, No. 041402-01.
5. See 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(7)(Administrative
Review Law provision calling for remand for the
purpose of taking additional evidence).
6. For municipalities, the zoning enabling act is
65 ILCS 5/11-13-1 et seq.; county zoning
authority is found at 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 et

seq.
7. 204 Ill. 2d 243 (2003).
8. Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d at 183.
9. Id. at 184, quoting Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
10. Hawthorne, 204 Ill. 2d at 253.
11. Id. at 253 n. 2.
12. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-5; see also 55 ILCS 5/512009 (in the Counties Code, variances are
authorized only "in accordance with general or
specific rules" contained in the county zoning
ordinance).
13. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1; see also 55 ILCS
5/5-12010(a, c).
14. Central Transp., Inc. v. Village of Hillside,
210 III. App. 3d 499, 503 (1st Dist. 1991),
quoting Parkview Colonial Manor Investment
Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 70 Ill. App.
3d 577, 581 (1979)(emphasis added).
15. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.
16. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-5, 5/11-13-13; 55 ILCS
5/5-12009, 5/5-12012.
17. Hawthorne, 204 Ill. 2d at 253.
18. Id.
19. See Thompson v. Cook County Zoning
Board of Appeals, 96 Ill. App. 3d 561, 571 (1st
Dist. 1981).
20. 335 Ill. App. 3d 325 (2d Dist. 2002).
21. Id. at 332.
22. 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.
23. 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (the ARL applies "where
the Act creating or conferring power on such
[administrative] agency, by express reference,
adopts the provisions of" the ARL).
24. 55 ILCS 5/1-6007.
25. See 55 ILCS 5/1-6005, 1-6006.
26. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook,
12 Ill. 2d 40, 46-48 (1957).
27. Two examples should demonstrate the
point. First, if a county board decides to reschedule a meeting to a day inconvenient to a
citizen who desired to attend the meeting and
who requested that the original date not
change, that decision could be subject to
appeal under the ARL. Although legislative
bodies have typically enjoyed freedom from
outside interference in setting their meeting
schedule provided the Open Meetings Act is
observed, under Gallik those decisions may be
subject to judicial scrutiny through the filing of
nuisance administrative review cases. Second,
a county board's adoption of a "pooper scooper" ordinance or any other regulatory matter
could also be subject to judicial scrutiny under
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the ARL-even though (i) such ordinances
involve no adjudication and are therefore purely legislative in nature, see Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d
at 184 (quoting Hannah v. Larche), and (ii)

such ordinances can be adopted without a prior

.

hearing (in which case there is no clear record
to review).
28. Shipp v. County of Kankakee, No. 3-020642 (3rd Dist., 12/16/03)(slip opinion).
29. Id., slip opinion, at 4.
30. 338 III. App. 3d 967 (2d Dist. 2003).
31. Oak Grove Jubilee Center, Inc. v. City of
Genoa, 331 Ill. App. 3d 102 (2d Dist. 2002).
32. 338 Ill. App. 3d at 975.
33. Oak Grove Jubilee Center, Inc. v. City of
Genoa, _
Ill. 2d _,
796 N.E.2d 1059
(2003).
34. 338 III. App. 3d at 976.
35. Id.
36. In light of the quasi-judicial role that local
legislators must play in special use proceedings
after Klaeren, there are serious questions
whether they can communicate with their constituents at all about pending zoning requests,
except as part of the public hearing process.
Cf. City of Chicago v. American Nat'l Bank, 171
Ill. App. 3d 680, 690 (1st Dist. 1988)(in building code enforcement matter, adjudicators
must give "special attention to ex parte" contacts, which may "turn up issues of due
process violations"); but see Southwest Energy
Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Bd., 275 Ill.
App. 3d 84, 92 (4th Dist. 1995)(ex parte contacts not necessarily a due process issue in
landfill siting proceedings); see also Jennings
v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA
1991)(ex parte contacts invalidate zoning proceeding under State statutory scheme that
makes zoning petitions quasi-judicial in
nature); accord E. McQuillin, 8A Municipal
Corporations, Sec. 25.262, 25.262.50 at 35053 (3d ed. 1994). Moreover, because the possibility of a due process claim arising from ex
parte contacts (as well as Section 1983 damages and Section 1988 attorney fee awards) is
palpable in our litigious society, local governments might be well advised as a risk management strategy to avoid all ex parte contacts.
This, unfortunately, would run counter to the
underlying policies of open government that
the General Assembly has promoted. See,
e.g., 5 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (Open Meetings
Act).
37. In fact, the only critical comments cited
from any Illinois authority was a specially concurring opinion in a case decided forty years
earlier. See Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 Ill.
2d 415, 424-25 (1962)(Klingbiel, J.)(expressing concern that legislative decisions regarding
special uses "are not judicially reviewable" and
creates "the obvious opportunity . . for special privilege, [and] for the granting of favors
to political friends and financial benefactors
. [because] the courts may not inquire into the
motives or reasons on which the legislative
body acted"). Justice Klingbiel's concerns,
however urgent they may have been in 1962,
lack the same urgency today for several reasons. First, Justice Klingbiel's fear that legislative decisions regarding special uses would be
unreviewable failed to appreciate the emergence of the LaSalle factors in giving courts
the tools to review local zoning decisions de
novo and without consideration of legislative
motives. Second, as discussed infra at notes
52-59 and accompanying text, the statutory
authority for special uses was modified to
address at least in part Justice Klingbiel's concern. Most importantly, there has been a basic
paradigm shift in the way local governments

act since 1962, to-wit: the adoption of the
Open Meetings Act in 1982 (P.A. 82-378), 5
ILCS 120/1 et seq., followed by the Freedom of
Information Act in 1984 (P.A. 83-1013), 5 ILCS
140/1, et seq. Thus, the all-too-common
"back room" deals that may have prompted

Justice Klingbiel's remarks lack the same currency today.
38. City of Chicago Hts. v. Living Word
Outreach Full Gospel Church & Ministries, Inc.,
196 Ill. 2d 1 (2001).
39. Klaeren, 202 III. 2d at 182-83, quoting
Living Word, 196 Ill. 2d at 14, 15-16.
40. In fact, in Living Word, the Court cited only
two provisions of the zoning enabling act of the
Illinois Municipal Code, and in neither instance
was the actual statutory language even discussed. See 196 Ill. 2d at 17, 24. Moreover,
in Klaeren, the Court did not even cite the provisions of the zoning enabling act in the portion
of its decision that overturned more than forty
years of precedent. See 202 Ill. 2d at 182-84.
41. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-13 (last amended in
1982); 55 ILCS 5/5-12012 (last amended in
1990). These amendment dates are important
in light of the Court's discussion in Living Word
regarding the effects of certain statutory
amendments made in 1969. See 196 Ill. 2d at
15-16; see also infra, notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1 (special use
permits); 65 ILCS 5/11-13-2 (adoption of a
new zoning code); 65 ILCS 5/11-13-5 and 1113-10 (variances in municipalities having populations less than 500,000); 65 ILCS 5/11-1314 (amendment to zoning ordinance regulations and zoning map designations); 55 ILCS
5/5-12007 (adoption of zoning ordinance); 55
ILCS 5/5-12009 (variances); 55 ILCS 5/512009.5 (special use permits); 55 ILCS 5/512014(b) (amendment to zoning ordinance
regulations and zoning map designations).
Note that the Counties Code authorizes that
such actions may be approved by the adoption
of an ordinance or a resolution.
43. Rather, the public hearing on a special use
request is to be conducted before "some commission or committee designated by the corporate authorities." 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1.
44. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1; see also 55 ILCS
5/5-12009.5(d)("The county board may, by
ordinance and without a further public hearing,
adopt any proposed special use..."). The only
exception is when a hearing officer is involved.
See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
45. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-1.1.
46. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C); 55 ILCS 5/512015(A)(2, 3).
47. 55 ILCS 5/5-12015(A)(3).
48. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C)(1, 2).
49. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C)(1).
50. Hawthorne, 204 Ill. 2d at 253 n. 2, 25758.
51. Id. at 253 n. 2.
52. 196 Ill. 2d at 15-16, citing Geneva
Residential Ass'n v. City of Geneva, 77 Ill. App.
3d 744 (2d Dist. 1979).
53. 77 Ill. App. 3d 744 (2d Dist. 1979).
54. Id. at 751, 756.
55. Id. at 754; see 65 ILCS 5/11-13-11. This
oversight alone undermines the Court's analysis in Living Word and its decision in Klaeren,
especially after the Court's declaration in
Hawthorne that a variance granted by the ordinance of a village board "is a legislative act."
204 Ill. 2d at 253.
56. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 754 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 754-55 (emphasis added).
Eliminating such ad hoc decision-making was
one of the concerns expressed in Justice
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Klingbiel's special concurrence in Ward v.
Village of Skokie, 26 Ill. 2d at 419-26, quoted
in Geneva Residential, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 75355.
58. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 754, quoting Ward, 26
Ill. 2d at 424-35 (Klingbiel special concurrence)(emphasis added).
59. This is clearfrom the court's de novo
review of the substantive terms of the
approved special use permit: the court treated
it as a legislative decision that was subject to
hearing based on the LaSalle factors. 77. Ill.
App. 3d at 757-59.
60. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1 (P.A. 84-960).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
62. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C)(2).
63. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C)(1).
64. 65 ILCS 5/11-13-14.1(C)(2).
65. 55 ILCS 5/5-12009.5 (P.A. 90-175).
66. 55 ILCS 5/5-12009.5(e).
67. 55 ILCS 5/5-12012.
68. See People ex rel. Klaeren v. Village of
Lisle, 316 Ill. App. 3d 770, 782 (2d Dist.
2000), aff'd 202 Ill. 2d. 164 (2002)("The legislature is presumed to know the judicial construction that a statute has been given, and
when the legislature re-enacts a statute without modification it is assumed to have intended
the same effect").
69. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text,
supra.
70. See Part B, supra.
71. See "If It Ain't Broke, Fix It?" 8 Pub. Int. L.
Rep. at 29. A similar amendment to Section
5/5-12012 of the Counties Code could also be
adopted.
72. Yet another snafu in the Court's analysis
was relying on E&E Hauling, Inc. v. County of
DuPage, 77 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (2d Dist. 1979)
for identifying the essential elements for an
adjudicative hearing. The E&E Hauling case
involved a rezoning, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1020,
which courts have long-recognized as a purely
legislative action. See Bieretz v. Village of
Montgomery, 67 Ill. App. 2d 403 (2d Dist.
1966).

WINTER 2004

WINTER 2004
6

